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Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) is a relatively new approach to describe macroeconomic
differencesacrosscountries, classifyingthemintocoordinatedmarketeconomies(CMEs)
and liberal market economies (LMEs). VoC already had a signiﬁcant impact on the
ﬁeld but has been criticised for its lack of linkage to political systems. Recent studies
focused on the similarities between CMEs and the Lijphartian consensus political sys-
tems, and LMEs and majoritarian political systems. One of the practical consequences
of this classiﬁcation is that governments in LMEs should enjoy more discretion over
ﬁscal policy while governments in CMEs are more constrained in their decisions. In
this paper we evaluate this proposition in two LME states – Ireland and the UK – where
the latter is an example of a pure majoritarian state while the former bares several in-
stitutional characteristics of the consensus state (e.g. electoral system and coalition
governments). We show that governments in both states enjoy relatively high degrees
of discretion over ﬁscal policy, but that in Ireland policy outcomes are more well bal-
anced in respect to interests represented by social partners. We thus provide empirical
evidence that supports the classiﬁcation proposed in the VoC approach. However, we
also demonstrate that the context of decision-making has a crucial impact on the discre-
tionary power of government, and that such context effects can change over time, even
within the same system type.
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process
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11 Introduction
Varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach applies the economics of organisation to the macroe-
conomy. It sees individual ﬁrms develop relationships with their own employees and ex-
ternal actors (clients, suppliers, trade unions, business associations, and governments) in
order to maximise on their core competencies (capacities to proﬁtably develop, produce,
and distribute goods and services) (Hall and Soskice, 2001a, 6). The authors argue that the
work on transaction costs and principle-agent problems in the economics of organisation
shows that these relations can be problematic, leading ﬁrms to face coordination problems
where the success of ﬁrms depends on their successful resolution of these problems (Hall
and Soskice, 2001a, 6). Approaches taken by ﬁrms to solve coordination problems allow
to differentiate capitalist economies into liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated
market economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2001a, 8). In turn, these two broad clusters
deﬁne general trends in national economic performance, comparative institutional advan-
tage, responses to globalisation, and comparative public policy (Hall and Gingerich, 2009,
450).
VoC approach has been both praised and criticised widely, and by that it serves the dis-
cipline in reinvigorating the debate about the core aspects of comparative political economy
(Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher, 2007a). Even ardent critics cannot deny the fact that VoC
has had a great impact on the ﬁeld. The concept has been introduced in a volume edited by
Hall and Soskice (2001b), which by now has been cited more than 2,600 times1. Among
the most frequent criticisms raised about the VoC approach, Hancke, Rhodes and Thatcher
(2007b, 8) list that it is “‘apolitical’, equilibrium-biased and downplays conﬂict” (see e.g.
Howell, 2003; Kinderman, 2005; Pontusson, 2005; Watson, 2003). Iversen (2007, 278)
1Google Scholar citation for Hall and Soskice (2001b), accessed 2010-07-26.explains that most of the VoC literature does not pay enough attention to the relationship
between the varieties of the production systems and political institutions. Soskice (2007,
91) suggests that the original VoC literature focused on understanding the mechanics of pro-
duction regimes and the complementarities of their key institutions, with their relationship
to political systems not being concertedly analysed.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between the type of capitalist regime and
government’s discretion in ﬁscal policy making. We compare the preferences of the State
with the preferences of interest groups over two distinct ﬁscal policies: the making of the
annual government budget and the distribution of European Union structural funds to sub-
regional units. To derive estimates of agents’ preferences, we utilise the latest advances
in automatic text analysis which we apply to interest groups’ policy submissions and ﬁnal
policy documents. The cases we analyse are from Ireland and the UK. Both countries are
characterised as liberal market economies but, at the same time, differ in their political in-
stitutions. The UK is often considered an European example of a ‘pure’ LME state (Hall
and Gingerich, 2009, 459), with majoritarian electoral system, leader-focused parties and
high discretion of the government over ﬁscal policy. Ireland is often considered an outlier
among other LME countries (e.g. Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 172, fn. 11) with its experi-
ence of coalition governments, a PR electoral system2 and the functioning social partnership
process that includes social and economic interest groups into policy making.3
Focusing ﬁrst on Ireland we evaluate relative government discretion in budgetary spend-
ing over the last ﬁve years (Section 3). Using the latest advancement in automated text anal-
2While Iversen and Soskice (2006, Table 4, note C) classify STV as similar to SMP due to the low con-
stituency size and strong centripetal incentives for parties, researchers are largely in agreement that STV is a
PR system (e.g. Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005).
3Social partnership has recently collapsed in Ireland as the result of stress from the economic crisis, but it
was functioning over the whole period under analysis.
3ysis, we estimate the policy position of both the ﬁnance minister and all relevant interest
groups for annual budgets from 2004 to 2009. We show that the ﬁnance minister’s position
is always well balanced between interest groups, but also affected by electoral concerns as
its position moves closer to the centre when the next election approaches. We next consider
the relative discretion of the government in the distribution of EU funding in Ireland and
the UK (Section 4). Standard links between government policy and national interest groups
have been recently extended to include regional interests. In the EU member states this is
the direct consequence of the process of regionalisation, where regions increasingly exert
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on national ﬁscal policy alongside the more traditional national interest
groups like trade unions and business associations. We show that, in the case of Ireland,
the ﬁnal government decision is well balanced between the preferences of subregional units,
which suggest that government was constrained in its freedom to decide the allocation of
funds. In England, in contrast, we ﬁnd that the ﬁnal policy outcome was less constrained
in regard to the preferences of interest groups, suggesting a higher degree of freedom for
government decision-making.
2 Previous Research and Hypotheses
The relationship between the VoC framework and political systems has been recently anal-
ysed in Gourevitch (2003) and Iversen and Soskice (2006), with Soskice (2007) further
summarising and developing the arguments. Accordingly, in Lijphartian (Lijphart, 1984)
terms, CMEs correspond to consensus political systems while LMEs are majoritarian. Sos-
kice (2007, 93) differentiates these two systems into differences in electoral systems (CMEs
use PR while LMEs use plurality); decision-making in political parties (Iversen and Sos-
4kice (2006) argue that in CMEs parties arrive at decision after negotiation across the interest
groups within the party, while in LMEs the party leader decides); and public policy is made
through effective committee systems in CMEs compared to government decision-making
in LMEs. Thus, the political system in CMEs allows the representation of preferences of
interests groups and their participation in the policy-making. This is reﬂected in various
spheres of policy-making where the interests of labour and business may share the goals
but have “sharply different ideal points within those areas” (Soskice, 2007, 94) with the dis-
putes settled within the broad framework of the institutional setting of the consensus system
(Soskice, 2007, 93). On the other hand, in LMEs the government reﬂects the interests of
the median voter with the ability of interests groups to affect policy-making being greatly
diminished.
In relation to public policy provision, strong uniﬁed governments that face small frac-
tured economic agents generally have more discretion on ﬁscal and monetary policy. That
is, these governments are not concerned with the possibility of their discretionary behaviour
weakening their bargaining positions (Soskice, 2007, 94). However, if the government faces
demands from powerful bargainers it is more likely to reduce its own discretion over ﬁs-
cal policy (Soskice, 2007, 100). The liberal market economies are largely characterised by
the former relationship between governments and organised interests, while the coordinated
market economies are generally characterised by the latter. Primarily this is explained by
the consensus nature of CMEs, where governments are often coalitions formed by parties
representing well-deﬁned interests. LMEs, in contrast, are generally single party govern-
ments with party leaders having a large impact on policy decisions (Soskice, 2007, 101).
Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009) show that ﬁscal policy can be characterised as
a common pool problem where individual ministers (or parties in coalition governments)
5aim to independently maximise the resources allocated in their portfolio while government
expenditure is ﬁnanced through general taxation. In order to solve the common pool prob-
lem, Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009) argue that coalition governments remove
discretion from ﬁscal policy. Correspondingly, ﬁscal policy in consensus political systems
is characterised by little discretionary expenditure (Soskice, 2007, 101). Furthermore, Sos-
kice (2007, 101) argues that conservative ﬁscal policy can be explained by the representative
nature of political parties in consensus systems (Iversen and Soskice, 2006) where prefer-
ences of interest groups (especially labour and business) are represented by political parties.
This gives interest groups direct access to the process of public policy formation. In the
case where interest groups are “individually powerful but imperfectly coordinated [...] the
common pool problem will be reinforced if ﬁscal control is weak” (Soskice, 2007, 102).
Conversely, LMEs have more discretion in the decision-making on ﬁscal policy.
We test the relative discretion of governments in ﬁscal policy making by analysing the
extent to which preferences of interest groups are reﬂected in policy outcomes. We conjec-
ture that government discretion is highest in the UK, which is classiﬁed as a “pure” LME
type system, and lower in Ireland, which – for reasons explained above – is somewhere
between LME or CME. Our research design is based on estimating interest groups’ pol-
icy preferences from their public statements that were submitted during the policy making
progress. In addition, we estimate the policy position of the government by analysing the
ﬁnalised documents that were published after the policy decision had been made.4 Scaling
4Text is by far the most abundant available source of data on preferences of agents and, more importantly,
every ofﬁcial statement is the result of an agent’s strategic decision about what preference to make public.
Certain characteristics of text, particularly word frequency distributions, can then be used to characterise pref-
erence proﬁles of the authors. (e.g. Baayen, 2001; Bybee, 2001). The wide availability of text in electronic
form has led to a large number of automated and semi-automated methods for scaling positions from the texts
based on the statistical analysis of word patterns (e.g. Laver and Garry, 2000; Pennings and Keman, 2002;
Benoit and Laver, 2003; Monroe and Maeda, 2004; Hilliard, Purpura and Wilkerson, 2006; Bara, Weale and
Biquelet, 2007; Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Yu, Kaufmann and Diermeier, 2008; Lowe, 2008; Quinn et al.,
2010; Hopkins and King, 2010; Grimmer, 2010). These methods have been applied in several macroeconomic
6these texts onto one dimension estimates the policy positions of all actors. Relative dis-
tance between the positions of all actors reﬂects how much text overlaps between different
documents. With the understanding that text produced by actors reﬂects their preferences,
this allows us to consider the overlap in policy preferences between different interest groups
and the State. In our setting this means that low discretion regimes will be characterised
by governments with positions in or close to the centre of the distribution (of scaled policy
positions) thus reﬂecting its balancing of competing interests. In the high discretion regimes
the position of the government can be in any part of the distribution of policy positions.
3 Government discretion over budgetary distribution
Budgetary process in Ireland is characterised by distributional pressures applied to the gov-
ernment from competing interests. Inﬂuence of interest groups on budgetary policy is dif-
ﬁcult to measure directly, with much of the lobbying happening outside the public view. In
such situations it is important to ﬁnd observable implications of policy preferences of inter-
est groups. Here we focus on the submissions made by interest groups during the budget
drafting process. While stakeholders may express their preferences to politicians in private,
budgetary submissions are public statements that reﬂect their preferences which they seek
to be reﬂected in the upcoming budget.
Quinn (2002) describes the budgetary process in Ireland as a long and well-organised
process that starts with the submission of expenditure estimates for the forthcoming year by
all government departments. At the same time, various interest groups present their cases for
consideration in pre-budget submissions, with well-established groups like social partners
studies. For example, in the study of national budgeting in Italy (Giannetti and Laver, 2005), long-term bud-
geting in Italian regions (Galli, Grembi and Padovano, 2009), ﬁscal policy in Canadian provinces (Imbeau,
2009), and ﬁscal positions of US state lottery agencies (Charbonneau, 2009).
7making the most serious and well-developed claims on resources. Minister for Finance then
is scheduled to meet with the leaders of several groups giving them the opportunity to argue
their case directly to the minister but also communicate information to their own members
in the process described as the “optics” of the pre-budget submissions (Quinn, 2002). The
Minister is briefed prior to the meetings on implications and costs of each submission, with
meetingsthemselvesbeingone-waydialogueswiththeMinisterlisteningandagreeing. This
is followed by interest group leaders giving extensive interviews about the effectiveness of
their lobbying on behalf of their organisations. Quinn describes the process of pre-budget
submission making as follows:
“The exercise is designed to keep the members of organisations content in the
belief that their executive and secretariat are presenting their interests effec-
tively. In other cases it is for the optics of the wider public.” (Quinn, 2002,
15)
This makes the submissions similar to the annual reports to shareholders and gives them
the genuineness and gravitas of public statements that could be scrutinised. The content of
submissions ranges from seeking up to 100 concessions to an approach that concentrates on
a narrow spectrum of demands.
Although a signiﬁcant number of organisations in Ireland make pre-budget submissions,
not all of them are currently available (particularly in electronic format). This is particularly
the case for earlier years. Overall, we were able to collect pre-budget submissions from 114
organisations, including all social partners, for all budgets from 2004 to 2009. The depth
of the time series is limited by the ﬁrst year for which we have submissions from all social
8partners (2004). Table 1 presents the list of organisations that are included in our sample.5
The preferences of the government on the budgetary distribution are derived from the text of
the budget speeches delivered in parliament by the Minister for Finance. Budget speeches
set out in detail government priorities over ﬁscal policy for the forthcoming year.
[Table 1 about here.]
In order to estimate policy positions of government and interest groups we use Wordﬁsh
(Slapin and Proksch, 2008), a method that combines Item Response Theory (e.g. Clinton,
Jackman and Rivers, 2004) with text classiﬁcation. Wordﬁsh assumes that there is a latent
policy dimension and that each author has a position on this dimension. Words are assumed
to be distributed over this dimension such that yijt  Poisson(lijt), where yijt is the count of
word j in document i at time t.6 The functional form of the model is assumed to be
lijt = exp(ait +yj+bjwit)
where ait are ﬁxed effects to control for differences in the length of documents and yj
are ﬁxed effects to control for the fact that some words are used more often than other words
in all documents. wit are the estimates of authors’ position on the latent dimension and
bjwit are estimates of word-weights that are determined by how important speciﬁc words
are in discriminating documents from each other. In this model, each document is treated
as a separate actor’s position and all positions are estimated simultaneously. If two actors
display a similar position, this means that both of them used words with similar frequencies.
Thus reﬂecting similar preference proﬁles on a given dimension of contestation.
5We explored the possibility of using the Freedom of Information Act to access all submissions made by
interest groups, but the price tag put on such exercise by the Department of Finance in reply to our request
proved prohibitively expensive.
6Poisson distribution of word frequencies is a standard assumption in natural language processing. See, for
example, Manning and Schutze (2002).
9The identiﬁcation strategy for the model sets the mean of all positions to 0 and the
standard deviation to 1, thus allowing shifts in positions relative to the mean with the total
variance of all positions ﬁxed (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). Effectively this standardises the
results and allows comparison of positions across estimations on a comparable scale when
the documents used in estimation are themselves comparable. This also addresses the issue
of the possibility of differential item functioning (DIF) (Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; King
etal.,2004)wheneconomicagentsdonotperceivethedimensionofcontestationinthesame
way. In the analysis of political congruence Achen (1978) and Golder and Stramski (2010)
propose to use a metric-free relative measure of congruence, where the distance between a
data point to the central tendency of the distribution is normalised relative to the dispersion.
Since the results of Wordﬁsh estimation are standardised as part of the estimation procedure,
this means actors’ positions are comparable across estimations.
Documents were pre-processed before being included in the estimation. We removed
text that has no policy relevant content such as cover letters or formal closing lines. We also
removed email addresses, URLs, and any material attached to a submission that was unre-
lated to the consultation process (e.g. actor’s postal address). We furthermore eliminated
numbers, punctuation marks, and tables and graphics, as they cannot be used in quantitative
text analysis to meaningfully distinguish documents from each other. Figure 1 presents the
results of our estimation including all interest group submissions. Figure 2 shows the same
results but limited to the budget speech and social partners, displayed as a time-series plot
that highlights changes in policy positions over time.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
10We estimate the position of the principle interest groups (unions and business associa-
tions) to be relatively stable over time. Over the whole period under investigation govern-
ment remained relatively in the centre of the distribution of preferences of interest groups.
However, we can also observe tangible shifts in the position of the government. Under
McCreevy the government was taking a centrist position, but with Cowen taking over the
Department of Finance the position of the State moved left and converged with the position
of the unions for the 2005 budget. At the time the government was a coalition between the
centrist FF (the dominant partner) and PDs (right of centre on the economy). FF coalition
with a smaller liberal PDs gave government relatively high discretion over ﬁscal policy as
the pressure of the common pool problems was relatively small. With the upcoming election
we observe the government position presented by Cowen moving towards the centre, thus
allowing the government to better balance competing interests in its electioneering effort.
After the 2007 general election the governing FF entered into a coalition with the Green
party (PDs taking an even more junior role after disastrous electoral performance and sub-
sequent dissolution). Facing a greater common pool problem in this ideologically wider
coalition, the government moved further to the right, introducing more conservative ﬁscal
policy. Along the argument in Soskice (2007, 100), a wider coalition with strong demands
on public spending lead government to reduce its own discretion over ﬁscal policy. This
more conservative ﬁscal position of the State remained in place in the ﬁrst budget presented
by Lenihan, now reinforced by the worsening economic conditions in general.
This section evaluated a general proposition in the literature (e.g. Soskice, 2007) that
links government’s discretion over ﬁscal policy to its relationship with national interest
groups. In the next section we evaluate governmental discretion over ﬁscal policy in the
setting of regional distribution of EU structural funds.
114 GovernmentdiscretionoverdistributionoftheEUstruc-
tural funds
Economic and social disparities among member states have become the policy focus of the
European Community. Aiming to deal with these disparities, the European Regional and
Development Fund (ERDF) was agreed upon at the 1972 Paris Summit and ﬁnalised two
years later. Creation of the ERDF reﬂected increasing salience of the issue of regional
disparities with the impending EEC enlargement to Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. The
distribution of the ERDF was based on national quotas and generally viewed as supplemen-
tary income for national Treasuries (Bache, 2007, 40). Cohesion became embedded in the
treaty base following the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. With the impending acces-
sion of Spain and Portugal structural funds were reformed in 1988, bringing together ERDF
with the European Social Fund (ESF) and the guidance section of the European Agricultural
Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF). The 1988 reform also doubled the funds by 1993,
and focused the spending priorities on regions (NUTS). The doubling of structural funds
came with the revisions of policy: clariﬁcation of the additionality requirement, introduc-
tion of the principles of concentration, programming, and partnership. The 1993 reform of
the structural funds focused mainly on the additionality principle, while the 1999 reform
focused on the necessary adjustments in light of the impending accession of countries of
central and eastern Europe.7
EU cohesion policy utilises structural funds (SFs) as its main instruments. In turn, Bache
(2007, 23) suggests that SFs can be viewed as governed by the “structural policy” (differ-
ent from policy applied to other instruments like, for example, Cohesion Fund). The 1988
7See Bache (2007) for a detailed history of structural funds in the EU.
12reform of SFs brought in new governing principles for structural policy: partnership, addi-
tionality, programming, and concentration. Focusing on the ﬁrst two principles, Gary Marks
developed the concept of “multilevel governance” to describe how “supranational, national,
regional and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks”
(Marks, 1993, 402-403). Multilevel governance refers to “continuous negotiation among
nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks, 1993, 392). Vertical interactions
and interdependence between governments of different territorial levels is conceptualised in
“multilevel”, while “governance” refers to increasing horizontal interaction and interdepen-
dence between governments and nongovernmental actors (Bache, 2007).
Structural funds of the European Union are designed to deal with economic and social
disparities among member states. Structural funds constitute the second largest item of the
EU budget after the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These funds are allocated by a
quota system between EU member states to support activities related to transport, com-
munication infrastructure, business development, protection of the environment and labour
market policies. Over the current spending period (2007-2013), for example, the UK is
expected to receive about e10.6 billion (DGRegio, 2008, 8). The distribution of EU SFs
in each member state is the process that involves national, sub-national, and other interests.
This is a legal requirement known as the Partnership principle, stipulated in Article 11 of the
Council Regulation governing the latest wave of SFs (OJL210/25, 2006, Article 11). Each
Member State is required to organise, in accordance with current national rules and prac-
tices, a partnership with national and sub-national authorities, economic and social partners,
and voluntary sector (OJL210/25, 2006, Article 11(1)). In the current SF regulations the
partnership principle has been strengthened to cover the preparation, implementation, mon-
itoring and evaluation of operational programmes (OJL210/25, 2006, Article 11(2)). The
13Commission has the right to monitor this process in annual consultations with the economic
and social partners (OJL210/25, 2006, Article 11(3)).
Speciﬁc distribution of the EU SFs across operational programmes in each country is
governed through a legally binding National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). The
EU policy for the latest round of funding dictates that each Member State must submit their
NSRF to the European Commission (OJL210/25, 2006, Article 28(2)). The aim of NSRFs
is to ensure that the assistance from the Funds is consistent with the EU cohesion policy and
links Community priorities with national reform programmes (OJL210/25, 2006, Article
27(1)). NSRF becomes a reference document for preparing the programming of the EU SFs
(OJL210/25, 2006, Article 27(2)). The content of NSRF contains analyses of developmental
problems, strategies to ameliorate the problems identiﬁed, a list of operational programmes,
descriptions of how proposed expenditures will contribute to competitiveness and job cre-
ation priorities of the EU, an indicative annual allocation by operational programme, and
other relevant information (OJL210/25, 2006, Article 27(4)).
While the NSRF preparation is required to be conducted in accordance with the principle
of partnership (Article 28), speciﬁc procedure and institutional structure is left to be deter-
minedbyindividualMemberStatesaccordingtocriteriatheydeemappropriate(OJL210/25,
2006, Article 28(1)).
4.1 Government discretion in the distribution of structural funds in
Ireland
For NSRF preparation, the Irish government decided to rely on solicitation of stakeholders’
views from other consultation processes – chieﬂy the National Development Plan (NDP)
14(Deane, 2006) – instead of consulting interest groups on their views.8 Effectively, the de-
velopment of NSRF from the NDP means that the Community priorities are aligned with
national reform programmes as required in structural funds regulations (OJL210/25, 2006,
Article 27(1)).
The National Development Plan has been informed by a comprehensive consultation
process that involved the regional bodies, social partners, and other interested parties (NDP,
2007, 33). The Government received 77 submissions that were complemented by meet-
ings with regional interests and social partners held in conjunction with two consultation
seminars hosted by the Minister for Finance (who also discussed the NDP before the Joint
Oireachtas Committee on Finance and the Public Service) (NDP, 2007, 33).
With no formal consultation process the task of collecting written submissions for the
NDP was a matter of contacting individual organisations listed as having taken part in the
consultations. We were able to collect submissions from both regional assemblies (NUTS1
level) and all eight regional authorities (NUTS2 level), complemented by a joint submission
made by all eight NUTS2 level authorities. We furthermore collected the submissions to
the NDP made by 12 national interest groups. Overall, we were able to collect 30% of the
submissions mentioned by the government (NDP, 2007, 33), but our sample includes all
regional authorities and all major interest groups involved in the social partnership process.
As the position of the government, we take the ﬁnal text of the NDP itself. The details of
collected submissions are presented in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
8The NDP set out an ambitious programme of investment over the period 2007–2013 of some e183.7
billion at 2006 prices. The amount of EU funding had been expected at some e3 billion over the whole period
drawn from various funds (NDP, 2007, 45). Apart from contestation over regional development priorities,
there were also competing interests, for example over the allocation emphasis on infrastructure, environment,
and equality and social inclusion (Morgenroth and FitzGerald, 2006; NDP, 2007, 33).
15The NDP was launched by the Taoiseach, the T´ anaiste and the Minister for Finance on
January 23rd, 2007, with less than six months left to the general election and unfavourable
showings in the opinion polls. It was viewed at the time to have been consciously writ-
ten with that election in mind, pushing “all the right psychological buttons” and promising
“something for everybody in the audience” (OpEd, 2007a). The government viewed the
launch of the NDP in purely political terms hammering home the message that “while things
have never been so good, the NDP will ensure even better times are on the way” but only if
“Fianna F´ ail and the Progressive Democrats are returned to ofﬁce to keep the plan on track”
(Collins, 2007). The opposition also viewed the document in political terms with the Labour
party ﬁnance spokeswoman, Joan Burton, describing “the 300-page document as ‘perhaps
the longest election leaﬂet in the entire history of the democratic world’ ” (Collins, 2007).
Two main themes (or dimensions) are represented in the NDP. One is the emphasis on
social inclusion measures, which constitute about half of the proposed expenditure. This
implements policies originated in the national agreement with the social partners achieved
in 2006. The second is the aim to redress regional imbalances. Balanced regional develop-
ment was one of the designated goals of the National Development Plan 2000-2006 but it
remained a “political pipedream” (OpEd, 2007b) with no substantial achievements to show
for it, laying “poor foundations” (McDonald, 2007) for the NDP 2007-2013. Unbalanced
spending witnessed over the NDP 2000-2006, with funding shortfalls particularly in poorer
Western regions, lead some local leaders to express scepticism over government’s commit-
ment to balanced regional development (Siggins, 2007).
We include all submissions made by regional authorities and national interest groups
together with the NDP text in our estimation. We again use Wordﬁsh to separately estimate
positions for regional submissions and submissions from national interest groups. This al-
16lows us to capture the two dimensions mentioned above. Estimation results are summarized
in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here.]
We ﬁnd that for the preparation of the NDP, government was carefully balancing the
interests of the regions by taking the centre of the distribution of regional preferences. With
national interest groups, however, government chose a position closer to that of the two
largest social charities in the country (CPA and SVP), which most likely was due to electoral
concerns.
Our ﬁndings suggest that Ireland despite many features attributable to the CME states
exhibited the discretion of the government in line with its general characterisation as a LME
state. However, upcoming elections also constrained the government by forcing it to take up
positions in line with their electioneering efforts.
4.2 Governmentdiscretioninthedistributionofstructuralfundsinthe
UK
As part of the NSRF preparation process, the UK government made a draft version of the
NSRF publicly available and invited comments on its draft from national as well as sub-
national stakeholders DTI (2006).9 The draft included a description of the government’s
policy objectives together with a list of 14 questions on which it sought consultation. These
questions asked for feedback on the policy goals government put forward (questions 1 to
4), the architecture of future structural funds programs (question 5), the allocation of funds
across regions (questions 6 to 8), and the coordination between funds and domestic spending
9The NSRF document was prepared and made publicly available by the Regional European Funds Direc-
torate, Department of Trade and Industry, via its website on February 28, 2006.
17(question 9). Questions 10 to 14 are related to problems speciﬁc to each of the four nations
(England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). Table A-1 in the Appendix lists the orig-
inal questions from the NSRF draft document. It is important to point out that the NSRF
draft document did not contain any numbers related to the allocation of funds. In fact, gov-
ernment purposely left all references that referred to fund allocations blank as it explicitly
requested feedback on what stakeholders would consider the best allocation scheme. This
means that, while government clearly acted as agenda-setter on the policy objectives that it
proposed in the draft NSRF document, it did not act as an agenda-setter on the allocation of
funds.
The consultation process lasted from February 28, 2006 (the date the draft NSRF was
published) to May 22, 2006. In total, 314 written submissions were made. The largest por-
tion of those submissions came from regional authorities and regional assemblies (39%),
followed by subregional umbrella organisations (25%) (e.g. Association of Greater Manch-
ester Authorities, Association of North East Councils) and national organisations (11%)
such as (e.g. British Chambers of Commerce, Trade Union Congress). Table 3 summarises
the number and proportion of submissions by respondent type.
[Table 3 about here.]
In terms of geographical distribution, more than half of the submissions came from
groups in England, the largest of the four UK nations (see Table 4).
[Table 4 about here.]
On October 23, 200610, ﬁve months after the submission deadline, government pub-
lished its ofﬁcial response to the consultation process. This document is organised along
10This is the document creation date.
18the same 14 questions that structured the consultation process. Under each question, gov-
ernment ﬁrst summarises the feedback it received and then presents its own response and
opinion on the question under consideration.
We only include responses from England in our analysis, which reduces the sample to
139 submissions.11 We divided submissions into two groups: regional authorities, by which
we mean every organization in the public sector (regional assemblies, regional authorities,
regional development agencies and regional associations), and regional policy groups, by
which we mean any private or voluntary organization in support of a particular policy issue.
Based on this classiﬁcation, 76 (55%) out of all England submissions are from regional
authorities and 63 (45%) from regional policy groups.
We pre-processed submissions following the same procedure as described above. Table
5 contains summary statistics for the pre-processed text documents. The average length of
documents is 1,673 and 1,168 words for submissions from regional authorities and policy
groups, respectively. The government response is signiﬁcantly longer with 5,751 words.
Figure 4 shows word-distributions for all submissions.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
We inlcude all submissions in our analysis irrespective of their length. Just like in the
Irishexampleabove, weconductseparateanalysisforregionalauthoritiesandpolicygroups.
The former group is primarily concerned about how money should be allocated, whereas the
latter is primarily concerned about how allocated money should be spend. Regional policy
11EU structural funds’ operational programmes are centred around the NUTS1 level regions. England con-
sists of 9 NUTS1 level regions, that together with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (one NUTS1 level
region each) form 12 NUTS1 regions of the UK. However, only English NUTS1 regions made submissions,
thus precluding the analysis across the whole of the UK.
19groups, of course, also care about the fund share of their region, but they are additionally
concerned about the policy objectives for which funds will be used. Figure 5 presents results
for regional authorities. Figure 6 shows the same results but, for ease of reading, reduced
to regional assemblies. Figure 7 presents results with the submissions of regional policy
groups.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
The results indicate that the UK is characterised by high levels of discretion of central
government over ﬁscal policy. This is particularly true in relation to preferences expressed
by regional interest groups. In terms of regional distribution of funds, preferences of the
government expressed in the NSRF are further away from the prosperous regions of East,
South East and London. In comparison to our results for Ireland, the Labour party in the
UK was just returned into ofﬁce at the time of the NSRF consultation process. Thus, elec-
tions did not play the constraining role in the UK as they did in Ireland. In the UK, central
government was capable of exercising high discretion pursuing its preferred policies of dis-
tribution of funds across regions. This high degree of discretion over ﬁscal policy in the
UK corresponds to the expert survey results provided in Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen
(2009).
205 Discussion
The varieties-of-capitalism literature differentiates developed capitalist economies by the
approaches the ﬁrms take to solve their coordination problems. This approach allows clear
differentiationofcountriesintoliberalmarketeconomiesandcoordinatedmarketeconomies.
One of the criticisms of the VoC approach is its detachment from countries’ political sys-
tems. Later advances of the VoC linked two main capitalist regimes (LME and CME) to two
Lijphartian types majoritarian and consensus democracies respectively.
One of the propositions of the VoC is that liberal market economies are characterised by
high discretion of the state over ﬁscal policy, while the CMEs are characterised by low dis-
cretion of the central government over ﬁscal policy. In this paper we analyse this proposition
by comparing the discretion of the government over ﬁscal policy in two states (Ireland and
the UK) that are both characterised as liberal market economies due to the approaches taken
by ﬁrms in solving coordination problems, whilst differing in their political institutions. Ire-
land shares many institutional commonalities with the consensus democracies (proportional
electoral system, high frequency of coalition governments). This makes its political system
similar to the VoC description of the coordinated market economies.
The VoC approach also overlooks the effects of regionalisation in the framework of
multilevel governance on the discretion of central government over ﬁscal policy. This is
particularly signiﬁcant in the EU member states where the policy of regionalisation is the
stated means of the Community development. In this paper we evaluate whether this new
dimension of policy making (involvement of regions in policy process) plays the role of an
additional constraint on government ﬁscal policy in Ireland and the UK.
Weﬁndthatdespiteitsmixedinstitutionalsetting, Irelandischaracterisedbyhighdegree
21of government discretion over ﬁscal policy as previously suggested by the VoC. We also ﬁnd
that elections can play a role of additional constraints on governments’ policy making. This
relates the VoC results to a wider literature on electoral and partisan cycles in economic
policies (see e.g. Franzese, 2002). We also ﬁnd that regionalisation of governance can also
impede the discretion of the government over ﬁscal policy. This relates the VoC results to a
wider literature on ﬁscal federalism (see e.g. Oates, 1999).
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26Appendix
Table A-1: Consultation questions in the NSRF draft document.
Question 1 Do respondents agree with the assessment in the draft National Strategic Reference
Framework of the economic strengths and weaknesses of the UKs nations and regions?
Question 2 Do respondents agree with the proposed priorities for future Convergence and
Competitiveness Programmes in England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar?
Question 3 Do respondents agree that the proposed priorities include a sufﬁcient focus on the
Lisbon Agenda?
Question 4 Do respondents agree with the proposals in the National Strategic Reference
Framework for ensuring consistency between Structural Funds Programmes and other EU policies
and funding streams, in particular spending under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Development and the European Fisheries Fund?
Question 5 Do respondents agree with the proposed architecture for future Programmes?
Question 6 Do respondents agree that the UKs Competitiveness allocation should be divided
equally between the ERDF and the ESF at the UK level?
Question 7 What are respondents views on how best to allocate ERDF Competitiveness funding
across the UKs regions?
Question 8 What are respondents views on how best to allocate ESF Competitiveness funding
across the UKs ESF programmes?
Question 9 Do respondents have views on how to improve coordination between Structural
Funds and domestic spending within England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland?
Question 10 Do respondents agree with the Governments proposals to align ERDF spending
with domestic programmes in England? What are respondents views on how best to achieve this?
Question 11 Do respondents agree that ESF delivery arrangements should bring together ESF
and domestic employment and skills funding in England to allow organisations to access a single
funding stream?
Question 12 Do respondents agree that greater use of single-stream funding mechanisms would
be beneﬁcial in Scotland?
Question 13 Do respondents agree with the Welsh Assembly Governments proposals to ensure
greater alignment with domestic strategies for regional development in Wales and a stronger
emphasis on larger, more strategic projects?
Question 14 Do respondents have views on how to align domestic and Structural Funds expendi-
ture and how to concentrate funding in Northern Ireland?
27Estimated policy positions for budget speeches and





































































































































































































Figure 2: Budget speeches by Minister for Finance and submissions from social partners,
2004–2009. No document was available for CIF in 2005 and the position plotted above was
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Policy positions for all regional units and UK government
Estimated Position
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ashfield district council (UKF) (RA)
association of greater manchester authorities agma (UKD) (RA)
association of north east councils (UKC) (RAC)
bedfordshire county council (UKH) (RA)
blackburn with darwen borough council (UKD) (RA)
black country consortium (UKG) (RA)
bolsover district council (UKF) (RA)
bristol city council (UKK) (RA)
cambridgeshire county council (UKH) (RA)
chester city council (UKD) (RA)
chesterfield borough council (UKF) (RA)
chester le street district council (UKC) (RA)
chief executives of the tyne and wear local authorities (UKC) (RA)
cornwall city council (UKK) (RA)
derby city council (UKF) (RA)
derbyshire county council (UKF) (RA)
devon county council (UKK) (RA)
dorset county council (UKK) (RA)
dudley metropolitan borough council (UKG) (RA)
durham county council (UKC) (RA)
easington district council (UKC) (RA)
east midlands development agency (UKF) (RDA)
east midlands regional assembly (UKF) (RG)
east of england (UKH) (RG)
east riding of yorkshire council (UKE) (RA)
east sussex county council (UKJ) (RA)
ellesmere port and neston borough council (UKD) (RA)
england response (GOVT) (GOVT)
gateshead council (UKC) (RA)
great yarmouth borough council (UKH) (RA)
hull city council (UKE) (RA)
isle of wight council and the isle of wight economic partnership (UKJ) (RA)
kent county council (UKJ) (RA)
lancashire county council (UKD) (RA)
leicestershire county council (UKF) (RA)
lincolnshire assembly (UKF) (RA)
liverpool city council (UKD) (RA)
local authorities south east region laser esf group (UKJ) (RAC)
local government east midlands lgem (UKF) (RG)
london region (UKI) (RG)
luton borough council (UKH) (RA)
mansfield district council (UKF) (RA)
medway council (UKJ) (RA)
newark and sherwood district council (UKF) (RA)
norfolk county council (UKH) (RA)
northamptonshire county council (UKF) (RA)
north devon district council (UKK) (RA)
north east assembly (UKC) (RG)
north norfolk district council (UKH) (RA)
north warwickshire borough council (UKG) (RA)
north west regional assembly nwda nwra (UKD) (RG)
north west universities association (UKD) (RA)
nottingham city council (UKF) (RA)
nottinghamshire county council (UKF) (RA)
one northeast (UKC) (RDA)
preston city council (UKD) (RA)
rotherham metropolitan borough council (UKE) (RA)
shropshire partnership and shropshire county council (UKG) (RA)
somerset county council (UKK) (RA)
southampton city council (UKJ) (RA)
south east england development agency seeda england na ukj (UKJ) (RDA)
south east england regional assembly (UKJ) (RG)
south tyneside council (UKC) (RA)
south west cohesion group (UKK) (RG)
stockton on tees borough council (UKC) (RA)
suffolk county council (UKH) (RA)
sunderland city council (UKC) (RA)
thames gateway london partnership (UKI) (RA)
thanet district council (UKJ) (RA)
torbay development agency (UKK) (RA)
warwickshire county council (UKG) (RA)
west midlands regional assembly (UKG) (RG)
west sussex county council (UKJ) (RA)
wigan metropolitan borough council (UKD) (RA)
wirral metropolitan borough of (UKD) (RA)
yorkshire and humber region (UKE) (RG)
yorkshire forward (UKE) (RDA)












Policy positions for regional assemblies and UK government
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north east assembly (RG)
north west regional assembly nwda nwra (RG)
yorkshire and humber region (RG)
east midlands regional assembly (RG)
west midlands regional assembly (RG)
east of england (RG)
london region (RG)
south east england regional assembly (RG)
south west cohesion group (RG)
GOVT
Figure 6: Estimated positions for regional authorities and the government. This graph shows


































































Policy positions for all policy groups and UK government
Estimated Position
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action halifax (UKE) (RPG)
alliance sub regional strategic partnership north derbyshire and north nottinghamshire (UKF) (RPG)
arts council england yorkshire (UKE) (RPG)
arts council of england north east (UKC) (RPG)
bedfordshire and luton local management group lmg (UKH) (RPG)
bournemouth dorset and poole economic partnership ltd (UKK) (RPG)
bradford european partnership (UKE) (RPG)
cefet (UKF) (RPG)
chester le street district partnership s economic regeneration policy group (UKC) (RPG)
combined universities in cornwall (UKK) (RPG)
cornwall s objective learning and skills task force (UKK) (RPG)
cornwall sustainable energy partnership (UKK) (RPG)
county durham economic partnership (UKC) (RPG)
cumbria partners (UKD) (RPG)
derby and derby economic partnership (UKF) (RPG)
east kent partnership (UKJ) (RPG)
east midlands environment link (UKF) (RPG)
east midlands further education council emfec (UKF) (RPG)
east midlands objective environmental sustainability advisory group (UKF) (RPG)
east midlands strategy for sustainable farming and food skills and business support steering group (UKF) (RPG)
engineering employers federation eef yorkshire humber (UKE) (RPG)
england response (GOVT) (GOVT)
english heritage south west region (UKK) (RPG)
english heritage yorkshire region (UKE) (RPG)
european officers group north east of england (UKC) (RPG)
european structural funds voluntary organisations northern esfvon (UKC) (RPG)
further education fe sector north east england (UKC) (RPG)
greater nottingham partnership gnp (UKF) (RPG)
herefordshire partnership (UKG) (RPG)
higher education regional development association south west (UKK) (RPG)
humber economic partnership (UKE) (RPG)
isles of scilly economic forum (UKK) (RPG)
kent and medway economic board kmeb (UKJ) (RPG)
kirklees partners (UKE) (RPG)
lancashire sub region (UKD) (RPG)
leeds partnership (UKE) (RPG)
liverpool john moores university ljmu (UKD) (RPG)
merseyside network for europe (UKD) (RPG)
north east london strategic health authority (UKC) (RPG)
north east partnership economic development sub group (UKC) (RPG)
northern way (UKC) (RPG)
north london strategic alliance nlsa (UKI) (RPG)
northumberland strategic partnership (UKC) (RPG)
north west network (UKD) (RPG)
partnership for urban south hampshire push (UKJ) (RPG)
peak district national park authority (UKF) (RPG)
regional forum for voluntary and community organisations (UKE) (RPG)
south east colleges aosec (UKJ) (RPG)
south east esf team strategy directorate (UKJ) (RPG)
south yorkshire partnership (UKE) (RPG)
south yorkshire passenger transport executive sypte (UKE) (RPG)
staffordshire partners (UKG) (RPG)
sw objective programme environmental sustainability theme partnership (UKK) (RPG)
tees valley joint strategy unit (UKC) (RPG)
universities for the north east unis ne (UKC) (RPG)
university of liverpool (UKD) (RPG)
university of teeside (UKC) (RPG)
vcs voluntary and community sectors (UKD) (RPG)
voluntary sector north west (UKD) (RPG)
wakefield district partnership wdp (UKE) (RPG)
west london area partnership wlap (UKI) (RPG)
west midlands regional assembly health partnership (UKG) (RPG)
west yorkshire enterprise partnership (UKE) (RPG)
york and north yorkshire partnership (UKE) (RPG)
Figure 7: Estimated positions for regional policy groups and UK government
.
34Table 1: Pre-budget submissions included in the sample.
Interest group Period covered
Name Abbreviation
Age Action Ireland AgeAction 2006-2008
Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies Ireland CCABI 2005-2009
Children’s Rights Alliance Childrens rights 2004
Citizens Information Board (Comhairle) CIB 2004-2009
Construction Industry Federation CIF 2004, 2006-2009
Sustainable Development Council Comhar 2007-2009
Conference of Religious of Ireland CORI 2004-2009
Combat Poverty Agency CPA 2004-2009
Dublin Chamber of Commerce DCC 2007-2009
Disability Federation of Ireland DFI 2005-2009
Federation of International Banks in Ireland FIBI 2005
Financial Services Ireland FSI 2005
Irish Business and Employers Confederation IBEC 2004-2009
Irish Banking Federation IBF 2005, 2009
Irish Congress of Trade Unions ICTU 2004-2009
Irish Exporters Association IEA 2008, 2009
Institution of Engineers of Ireland IEI 2004
Irish Farmers’ Association IFA 2006-2009
Irish Hospital Consultants Association IHCA 2009
Irish Hotels Federation IHF 2008
Irish Insurance Federation IIF 2004, 2005
Irish Medical Organisation IMO 2008, 2009
Institute of Professional Auctioneers and Valuers IPAV 2008, 2009
Irish Small and Medium Enterprises Association ISME 2004, 2006 - 2009
Irish Taxation Institute ITI 2004-2009
National Women’s Council of Ireland NWCI 2004 - 2009
National Youth Council of Ireland NYCI 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009
Small Firms Association SFA 2004
Society of the Irish Motor Industry SIMI 2004 - 2009
Society of St Vincent de Paul SVP 2004 - 2009
35Table 2: NDP submissions included in the sample.
Regional authorities
Name (NUTS code) Abbreviation
Joint Regional Authorities submission RAs
Border, Midland and Western Regional Assembly (IE01) BMW
Border Regional Authority (IE011) BRA
Midland Regional Authority (IE012) MRA
West (IE013) WRA
Southern and Eastern Regional Assembly (IE02) SE
Dublin Regional Authority (IE021) DubRA
Mid-East Regional Authority (IE022) MERA
Mid-West (IE023) MWRA
South-East Regional Authority (IE024) SERA
South West Regional Authority (IE025) SWRA
Interest groups
Name Abbreviation
Age Action Ireland AgeAction
Construction Industry Federation CIF
Sustainable Development Council Comhar
Combat Poverty Agency CPA
Disability Federation of Ireland DFI
Irish Business and Employers Confederation IBEC
Information and Communications Technology Ireland ICT
Irish Congress of Trade Unions ICTU
Irish Exporters Association IEA
Irish Farmers’ Association IFA
National Disability Authority NDA
Society of St Vincent de Paul SVP
36Table 3: Distribution of respondents type from which submissions were made
Respondents type
Regional Authorities and Regional Assemblies 39%
Subregional umbrella organisations 25%
National organisations, Professional bodies, Trades Unions,
Industrial Organisations
11%
Education and skills organisations, including Higher Education,
Further Education, Third sector
8%
Other Third Sector/ Voluntary 8%
Political parties, MPs, MEPs, other parliamentarians 4%
Regional Development Agencies 2%




37Table 4: Distribution of submissions by geographical area
UK organisations 10%














Number of documents: 76 63 1
Average document length








 Actual number of words in document
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
39Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland